A Public Health Care Puzzle by Seppälä, Timo
öMmföäflsäafaäsflassflassf
Discussion Papers
A Public Health Care Puzzle
Timo Seppälä
Centre for Health Economics at STAKES, RUESG and HECER
Discussion Paper No. 163
May 2007
ISSN 1795-0562
HECER – Helsinki Center of Economic Research, P.O. Box 17 (Arkadiankatu 7), FI-00014
University of Helsinki, FINLAND, Tel +358-9-191-28780, Fax +358-9-191-28781, E-mail
info-hecer@helsinki.fi, Internet www.hecer.fi
HECER
Discussion Paper No. 163
A Public Health Care Puzzle*
Abstract
It is a well documented fact that people do delay their doctor's visit when severe
symptoms emerge. This causes extra costs for a publicly provided health care system.
The other burden of a public health care system is over utilisation. A great deal of the
over utilisation is by the patients that are not in need of a medical treatment but could
easily survive with some self-medication. This constructs a puzzle: a part of the patients
that should seek medical care stay inactive while the system is utilised mainly by those
who are not in need of medical care. This paper contemplates interaction between
patient behaviour and government's actions. A patient is equipped with hyperbolic
preferences and he is either naive or sophisticated while time-consistent patient
provides the benchmark. The government's possible actions are reduced to set a
consultation fee, a deductible from it and a budget balancing tax rate. The redemption is
accepted for patients whose diagnoses reveal a disease that needs to be treated with
some non-self-medication methods. The main results establish that fairly small changes
in the fee and the deductible can cause substantial changes in patients' behaviour.
Naives are affected the most and actually their delays can become so long that
counterintuitive change in the fee or deductible would actually decrease the total costs.
Finally, an assumption about the partition of the types of individuals in the economy is
crucial when choosing the consultation fee, the deductible and the tax rate, since
assuming the absence of time-consistents or sophisticates is never as harmful as
assuming the absence of naives in a case where they all exist.
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1 Introduction
While Kenkel (2000) points out the importance of preventive actions as a part of medical expenditure
formation for health care systems, it is not only about whether people take preventive actions to
keep them selves in shape to avoid costly treatments but also do they seek medical help in time when
they notice some symptoms. The following questions arise. Why do people visit a doctor when he
or she has only minor symptoms, and on the other hand, why do people not consult a doctor when
some symptoms, sometimes even very clear ones, have been lasting very long, and it is quite obvious
that one is in need of a diagnosis and of some medical treatment? These phenomena are causing
large expenses for economies supporting a public health care system.1 Firstly, it is obvious that
utilising a health care system when it is not necessary causes sunk costs. Secondly, since usually
costs of a medical treatment are not linear nor constant in time if a disease is serious, delaying a
visit to a doctor causes the costs to increase fast and those can be very high once procrastinator
nally gets the treatment.2 In the public debate, it has been claimed that since people do not pay
the market price from visiting a doctor, these services are overutilised and costs accrue unnecessary
high for the economy. The second problem, i.e. not to visit a doctor when one should, has got much
less public attention while it is empirically well documented fact that people do delay their doctor
visits and in this manner cause higher health care costs than what would be attained if people
visited a doctor when it is necessary.3 The public health care puzzle emerges, people who should
exploit the public health care system stay inactive whereas it is exploited by those who could easily
survive without any medical consultation. In other words, medical costs are increased from the
both ends.
What then makes people to delay doctors visits when a public health care system covers the
expenditures? A naif answer would lean on easy verbalism:"Time is money", i.e. observed procras-
tinators just happen to have a higher marginal cost for time compared to those who visit a doctor
immediately after noticing symptoms. While a neat and clean answer, the problem is that it is not
in line with empirical ndings. Caplan (1995) nds that women with increasing symptoms are more
likely to delay than women whose symptoms either decreased or remained the same. Meechan et al.
1 In here, a public health care system refers to a system in which citizens do not have to pay directly anything
or only a very small nominal payment to get a medical consultation and treatment when necessary. Hence all costs
from the medical care are beared by a local or national government and funded indirectly via taxation.
2About the formation of treatment costs see eg. Butler et al. (1995).
3See eg. Facione (1993), Caplan (1995), and Meechan et al. (2002).
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(2002) nd, in addition, that women who discovered their breast symptom by chance or through
breast self-examination had a shorter delay than women experiencing breast pain. There was also
a trend for women who had a family member with breast cancer to have a longer delay time before
seeing their general practitioner. Mohamed et al. (2005) show in their empirical study that delays
are associated with demographic variables such as lower education, socioeconomic status and older
age, as well as, with psychological factors including e.g. severe anxiety and psychosis. None of these
interesting ndings point out that lackness of time would be the reason to delay the doctors visit
once symptoms emerge but rather show clearly how anxiety, anticipatory feelings, fears, and other
things cause procrastination.4 However, it is not an easy task to build up a theoretical model that
would explain why the delayed visits occur.5 Especially, behaviour that is present in data is hard to
explain with conventional models since those models are incapable of establishing time-inconsistent
behaviour. Fortunately, recent literature shows us that where the conventional models seem to be
inadequate to explain the phenomenon, steering the models into the direction of behavioral eco-
nomics facilitates the task. For starters, Caplin and Leahy (2001) develop a model that explains the
patients time inconsistent behaviour with anticipatory feelings. Köszegi (2003) then concentrates
solely on patients decision-making and applies the Caplin and Leahy (2001) model to explain de-
layed doctors visits, and shows that anxiety can lead the patient to avoid doctors visits or other
easily available information about his wealth. This means that the belief about future health is
taken into a utility function and the patient is assumed to be information aversive. That is, he
procrastinates doctors visit the longer the stronger is his belief that information from doctors visit
is bad, i.e. utility decreasing.6 On the other hand, there is also other explanation that does not
utilise anticipatory feelings but endogeneous determination of time preference. Namely, Becker and
Mulligan (1997) (BM) show that if time discounting is a¤ected by e.g. mortality, uncertainty, and
addictions delayed visits to a doctor will occur without including anticipatory feelings in to a model.
Hence, in some cases where an agents actions might seem to be caused by anticipatory feelings or
suchlike, the correct answer for observed behaviour is rather endogeneous time-preference. In their
4Note here also that time is moneyexplanation is not good when the focus is on public health care system usage.
Those who have higher cost to wait usually utilise private sector. In this paper we do not concentrate on private
sector at all but we are solely interested in studying behaviour of those who have already chosen to use the public
health care.
5For empirical evidence about preproperation and procrastination in completing pleasant and onerous tasks see
e.g. Ainslie (1992) and further references therein.
6We use he as a personal pronoun for a generic individual. The choice was made by tossing a fair coin.
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model discounting occurs due to an imperfect ability to imagine the future. They consider a case
where an individual has a possibility to improve his capacity to appreciate the future. This action
is costly, and hence it is subject to individual optimisation. A discount factor, ; is a function
of I, where I is an investment in improving ones capacity to appreciate the future. Endogenous
discount factor  (I) satises the following properties:  (I) > 0, 0 (I)  0; and 00 (I)  0 for all
I  0. In the light of current paper, an interesting implication of Becker and Mulligan model is that
di¤erences in health could cause di¤erences in time preference. This could happen since greater
health reduces mortality and raises future utility levels, and so those with greater health have also
a greater incentive to invest in improving ones capability of value the future than those with poor
condition of health. Thus, discounting happens to be milder for people in good shape than what
it is for ill persons. Kenkel (2000) notes that while in theoretical studies insured people are less
likely to take preventive actions due to ex ante moral hazard there is little empirical evidence on
that from systems which support private insurance.7 However, studying public health care systems
reveals that theoretical predictions are supported by data and ex ante moral hazard can be shown
to exists. Picone et al. (2004) study the e¤ects of risk, time preference, and expected longevity on
demand for medical tests. They build up a theoretical model and test it with the data from Health
and Retirement Study. At the focal point of the study are women and how they obey national
recommendations to treat themselves against breast cancer. Interesting results establish that 1)
nearly a third of the woman in the data set are quite myopic and they are less likely to demand for
medical tests, 2) those with longer expected life are more likely to engage in preventive behaviour,
and 3) uninsured women are less likely to seek for medical tests.
While plenty of studies in the eld are about valuableness of preventive screeing programs, in
this paper we consider a slightly di¤erent setup where the main focus is on interaction between
patient behaviour and cost formation of the public health care system where the costs are e¤ected
by the chosen behaviour. Ideas for modeling are captured from the discussed studies. We are keen
to contemplate: 1) the patient behaviour in a case where one rst notices (some) symptoms and
then decides whether to seek medical help immediately or postpone the task to later periods, 2)
the e¤ects of the delays on costs for the public health care system, and nally, 3) the governments
7 It is called ex ante moral hazard to emphasise the e¤ect of an insurance on action people takes before his state of
health is known. By this terminology ex post moral hazard is then a term for the action people takes after getting
to know his state of health (see Kenkel (2000)).
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optimal actions to balance to health care budget and avoid unnecessary high medical costs.
In our simple setup there are three patient types: time-consistent, hyperbolic naif, and hyper-
bolic sophisticated. We lean on empirical ndings about myopic patients in Picone et al. (2004) and
hence we assume that patients can have hyperbolic preferences. The intertemporal utility function
we use is the same that is commonly used for hyperbolic preferences, and hence gets the following
form: Ut = ut+1=1
ut+ ; where  is short-run discount factor and  < 1 for hyperbolic patient
and  = 1 for the time-consistent, while  is a conventional exponential long-run discount factor.
We use basic detions for naivety and sophistication, hence, naif is the one who does not realise
his future self-control problems (i.e. does not know the future  to be < 1) while sophisticated is
the one who knows perfectly his future self-control problems.8 We revise the ideas from BM and
consider that while the patient cannot invest in improving ones capacity to appreciate the long
distance future (i.e.  is the same for all) the short-run discount factor is a function of symptoms s.
We let  (s) <  (s), where s is the level of the symptoms and s < s: In the language of BM this
means I (s) < I (s) :9 We take the investments given, automatic and non-monetary:10 Another
crucial point in our modeling is that we assume patients to have a subjective positive probability
for symptomsdisappearance (or peristence). When time elapses it approaches its real probability
of 0 (1).11 This means that the patient rst considers it possible that symptoms vanish away along
passage of time but if those stay persistent then this subjective probability will be updated towards
more persisting symptoms. Naturally this increases the patients willingness to seek for a treatment
for the disease, and consequently he cannot delay visiting a doctor indenitely.
Delayed visits to a doctor are under our special interests, since those can be very costly for public
health care system and costs of the delayed visits are rarely discussed in the recent literature.12 We
model the costs with a function which shape follows ndings in Butler et al. (1995). The function is
simplied version of that but it captures the basic and necessary properties for the cost formation.
8See eg. ODonoghue and Rabin (1999).
9This idea is supported by BM since according to their study those people who consider their future to be pleasant
are ready to invest in improving ones capacity to appreciate future more than those with onerous future prognoses.
10Notice that severity of symptoms has only e¤ect on a hyperbolic patients preferences and not at all on a time-
consistent patients preferences. Implicitely this means that we assume symptoms to be e¤ective only for those who
"su¤er" from reversing preferences, that is, those who have hyperbolic preferences.
11This is quite natural assumption, since people have a tendency to give probability for symptoms to vanish away.
However, for persisting symptoms it happens that probability to vanishing decreases while persistence gets heavier
probability.
12Most of the studies discuss about screening programs and their e¢ ciency and cost e¤ectiveness but not the cost
e¤ects of delayed visits to the public health care system.
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For the rst two stages of the disease the costs are the same but after that they start to increase
dramatically.13 The governments focus is on cost formation since we assume that the health care
system is publicly nanced. Under contemplation is then the governments possibilities to set a
consultation fee and reimbursement from that as well as the optimal tax rate.
The main results establish that fairly small increases (decreases) in the fee (the deductible) can
cause substantial changes in patientsbehaviour. Naifs are a¤ected the most and actually their
delays can become so long that a decrease (increase) instead of an increase (decrease) in the fee
(the deductible) would decrease the total costs from the system and hence the tax rate resulting in
higher expected intertemporal utility from social planners viewpoint. Finally, an assumption about
the partition of the types of individuals in the economy is crucial when choosing the consultation
fee, the deductible and the tax rate, since assuming the absence of time-consistents or sophisticates
is never as harmful as assuming the absence of naifs in a case where they all exist. The policy
relevance of the results is then immediate. Using a conventional assumption of the sole existence of
time-consistent individuals can lead not only on substantial imbalances of the health care budget
but also on completely falsely selected corrective actions. In addition, while the direct costs for the
public health care system can increase due to interaction of the chosen policy and the existence of
time-inconsitents, the indirect costs for the whole social security system can increase even more as
the unnecessary long delays can cause losses in patients productivity and through that in several
other dimensions.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we construct the model. Section 3
analyses patient behaviour whereas governments actions are analysed in Section 4. Finally, Section
5 concludes by discussing the implications of the results.
2 The model
We consider a publicly nanced health care system which costs are initially fully covered through
taxation. To revise nancing, the government has a possibility to establish a fee, b  0; for a
consultation visit to a doctor, while treatments are still free of charge. This is to say that after
establishing the fee all medical treatments and the part of the system costs that is not covered by the
13 In clinical studies it has been found that tomor size, for example, doubles in from one week to 300 days. On
average the doubling time is 150 days.
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fee are still nanced through taxatation. Finally, we suppose that if a medical examination reveals
a serious disease the government will repay (1  ) fraction of the fee to a patient,  2 [0; 1].14 We
assume then that cost minimising behaviour of a patient who observes symptoms in some period
t for the rst time would be waiting until period t + k before seeking medical help.15 We, hence,
assume that diseases in the model are such that even for serious diseases k periods waiting time does
not increase the treatment costs.16 On the other hand, we assume that no asymptomatic diseases
exist in the economy. This is to say that those who have serious disease have also the symptoms
always.
The timing of events is the following. In the begining of each period the patient notices the level
of symptoms. After that he decides whether to visit a doctor in the current period or postpone it
for a subsequent self. The patients every period task is then to maximise his intertemporal utility
given his perceptions about his future behaviour.
For notational ease we use Nnm to denote a sequence of natural numbers from m to n:
Symptoms We denote symptoms in period t by st; st  0, and st = 0 refers to no-symptoms.
We assume that the incidence of having symptoms is  2 (0; 1): By t we refer to the period when
an individual noticed the symptoms for the rst time. We assume that in the rst k periods after
the symptoms emerged the probability of having a serious disease, tr (tr as true) is  2 (0; 1) and
if the symptoms still occur in (k + 1)th period from the rst observation the disease is severe with
certainty. 17 Formally,
tr (njt) =

; if n  k
1; if n > k
;
14 In here, a disease is serious if it does not heal without a medical treatment or prescribed medicines. The opposite
for the serious disease is called here as harmless. The fraction  is then deductible fraction for the patient that must
be paid for visiting a doctor no matter what.
15As it will be seen later in this paper, it is clear that if symptoms are severe enough the assumption fails to hold.
However, we see this assumption plausible since when considering e.g. symptoms that are typical for the u it is
rather optimal to wait some time after the emerged symptoms than immediately visit a doctor, and if the symptoms
stay at a constant level or get worse then seek for a medical care. In other words, since some symptoms lead rather
to a set of diseases than for a certain disease more time can clarify the symptoms and hence severity of a disesase.
16For example, a breast cancer has a cost function that shows to be of this form. I.e the treatment costs do not
increase between Stage 0 and Stage 1 at detection. Naturally, it is implausible to consider any waiting time to be
optimal for cancers but for some milder diseases, the kind of where medical treatment is not always necessary, k
periods waiting time can be optimal if the patient really visits a doctor when the symptoms are still present after k
periods.
17More natural assumptions would be st+1   st > 0 with probability of sev = sev(s) for which 0sev(s) > 0;
00sev(s) < 0: So, that probability of having more extreme symptoms would be function of this period symptoms,
and with the property that the harder are the symtoms the more probable it is that they get even worse when time
elapses.
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where n is the time distance from the period t.18 Naturally, the probality of getting cured without
seeing a doctor is given by the complement, i.e. by 1  tr (njt) :
We assume that there is a cure for all exisiting serious diseases, and hence if the patient visits
a doctor in period t he will get rid of the symptoms from the next period t+ 1 onwards.19
Patients The patient i is a hyperbolic discounter and innitely living, and his type 'i belongs
in the type set  = fN;S; Tg; where N is naif, S is sophisticated, and T is time-consistent.20
Adopting the fashion of discounting and the denitions for naivety and sophistication from the
recent literature on hyperbolic preferences causes all the types to be identical in all manners except
in their discounting and perceptions about future behaviour. We denote the discount factors by
 2 (0; 1] ;  2 (0; 1], and perception about future behaviour by ^  . We use a multiselves
approach, and thus we model the patient as a sequence of autonomous temporal selves. These
selves are indexed by the respective periods in which they control the choice variable, and we
denote a self in period t by self(t). The patients intertemporal utility for self(t) is of the following
form:
Ut = ut + 
1X
=1
ut+ ;
where ut = u (Ct;Ht) = CtHt is an instantaneous utility loosely following Picone et al. (1998),  is
the time-inconsistent discount factor, and  the conventional time-consistent exponential discount
factor.21 In the instantaneous utility Ct is current consumption and Ht is the state of the health.
We assume that
Ht = Ho   st;
where Ho is full health, and ut must be positive for the patient to be alive. For simplicity we assume
that st 2 f0; sg8t; and if st = s we denote Ht = Hs:
To keep things as simple as possible we assume that there is no possibility to save and hence if
18 It should be obvious that tr (njt) is dened only for n  t.
19Without loss of generality, we assume that no matter whether the disease is serious or not the patient gets rid
of the symptoms in the next period after visiting the doctor.
20The agent is said to be hyperbolic discounter when he discounts a time interval in near future heavier than in
the distant future. Eg. if one prefers 1 apple today over 2 apples tomorrow but at the same time he prefers 2 apples
after 101 days over 1 apple after 100 days, these choices imply that the agent might have hyperbolic preferences.
21The form of the intertemporal utility function becomes from Strotz (1955-56), Phelps and Pollak (1968), and
nally from Laibson (1994).
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the gross-of-tax income is denoted by wg and the tax rate by g: It directly follows
Ct = w
g (1  g) Mt
= w  Mt;
where w is the periodical net-of-tax salary and Mt is medical expenses in period t that is given by
Mt =
8>>><>>>:
0; if s = 0
b; if self (t) visits a doctor in t but disease is not serious
b (1  ) ; if self (t) visits a doctor in t and disease is serious:
;
and hence Ct is consumption in period t on other thing from medical commodities.
We make a novel assumption by assuming that symptoms have an e¤ect on the magnitude of ,
hence  is considered to be a function of s. We assume that 0 (s)  0 and 00 (s) > 0 if 0 (s) < 0:
Notably,  is also a function of ' and  (s; ') =  (s) for ' 2 fN;Sg and  (s; ') = 1 for ' = T:
Every type is now fully described by a 3-tuple ( (s) ; ^ (s) ; ); i.e. ( (s) ; 1; ) isN; ( (s) ;  (s) ; )
is S, and (1; 1; ) is T: In words, the naif patient is completely unaware and the sophisticated patient
fully aware of the reversals in their future preferences while the time-consistent patient does not
"su¤er" from the reversing preferences at all.
About the patients medical knowledge we assume that he does not have proper skills to diagnose
true severity of a disease after observing the symptoms but instead has a subjective probability on
persistence or severity of a disease. The subjective probablility is conditional on how long the
symptoms have lasted. This probability is denoted by sub (njt) (sub as subjective) that is dened
by sub (njt)  
1
n+1 ; where  2 [0; 1], n 2 N1t t ; and when t and t are clear from the context
we simplify by denoting sub (njt)  n: The subjective probability sub (njt) tells us that if
symptoms still appear in period t + n the subjective probability that symptoms occur also in the
subsequent period t + n + 1 is 
1
n+1 : In the same manner, we dene the complement, i.e. the
patient considers that the symptoms will vanish away between periods t + n and t + n+ 1 with
probability of 1  sub (njt).22
When contemplating a patients behaviour we adopt and use the concepts given in ODonoghue
22Note that sub (njt) is increasing in n; implying that even though the patient is incapable of knowing that k
periods persisted symptoms actually imply a serious disease, he will learn it when time elapses.
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and Rabin (1999) (OR 1999). The patients behaviour is then fully described with a strategy,
'  f'g1=1; that tells us when a patient of type ' is willing to visit a doctor, ' = v; and when
he is willing to delay the visit, ' = d. We get a solution concept that is called a perception-perfect
strategy, which is stated in the following denition, where U't (n) is an expected intertemporal
utility for self(t) of type ' in a case where the patient plans to visit a doctor in period n.
Denition 1 (Revised from OR 1999) A perception-perfect strategy for
i) T is a strategy T   T1 ; T2 ; T3 ; ::: that satises for all t Tt = v i¤ UTt (t)  UTt () for all
 > t;
ii) N is a strategy N   N1 ; N2 ; N3 ; ::: that satises for all t Nt = v i¤ UNt (t)  UNt () for all
 > t;
iii) S is a strategy S   S1 ; S2 ; S3 ; ::: that satises for all t St = v i¤ USt (t)  USt (0) where
0  min>tfjS = vg:
About Ts and Ns strategies Def.(1) states that 'z = v if and only if there is no other visiting
period in the future providing higher utility from self(z)s view point.23 For S the strategy is a bit
di¤erent since he, unlike N , understands that his future intertemporal preferences are subject to
change. From this it follows that self(z) of S completes the visit in ongoing period if and only if
there does not exist a self in tolerable time who would complete the visit. This tolerance is dened
next.
Denition 2 A tolerance for self(t) of type ' is {'t  max>tf j U't (t) < U't ()g t and {'t  0
i¤ max>tf j U't (t) < U't ()g   t = ?
A tolerance for self(t) tells us how many periods at maximum he would be willing to postpone
the visit from his perspective. Note here that while {'t can be innite, it does not necessarily mean
that the visit is postponed innitely. On the other hand, if the tolerance is 0; then the visit is
immediate for sure. The next denition provides then a realising visiting period
Denition 3 (Revised from OR 1999) A realising visiting period for a patient who observed the
symptoms in period t is 't  mintftj't = vg; ' 2 fT;N; Sg:
23 It is reasonable to note here that while Ts and Ns strategies seem to be the same, Ts strategy is based on
perfectly known future behaviour while for N perceptions about future behaviour are fallacious.
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In our model the intertemporal expected utility takes the following forms
U't (t)  (w  m (t + (1  t)))Hs +  (s; ')
wHo
1   ;
U't (t+ n) 
nX
z=1
Pt;zU
'
t (curet+z) +Rt;nU
'
t (seekt+n) for n  1; (1)
where
Pt;n  (1  t) for n = 1;
Pt;n 
 
1  t+n 1
 n 2Y
=0
t+ for n > 1;
Rt;n 
n 1Y
=0
t+ ;
U't (curet+n) 
 
1 +  (s; ')
n 1X
=1

!
wHs +  (s; ')
nwHo
1   ;
U't (seekt+n) 
 
1 +  (s; ')
n 1X
=1

!
wHs
+ (s; ') n
 
w  m  t+n +  1  t+nHs +  (s; ') n+1wHo1   :
In Eq.(1) the rst term on the right hand side is the expected utility from possibilities to get cured
without visiting a doctor, and the second term is the expected utility in a case where he does not
get cured without the visit before t+ n and visits the doctor in that particular period.24
To this end we dene attractivity, which quanties the patients willingness to visit a doctor by
solving the lower limit for the consultation fee for which the agent still would like to postpone the
visit at least one period.25
24For the derivation of the intertemporal utilities above see Appendix A.
25For more detailed information how the attractivity has been derived see Appendix B
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Denition 4 Given the expected utility, dene the attractivity, A't ; for self(t) of type ' as follows
U't (t) < U
'
t (t+ 1)
, m >  (s; ') tws 
1  t (1  )   (s; ') t
 
1  t+1 (1  )

Hs
) A't 
 (s; ') tws 
1  t (1  )   (s; ') t
 
1  t+1 (1  )

Hs
:
Note that ANt = A
S
t , hence we use A
T
t to refer Ts attractivity while A
'
t = At for ' 2 fN;Sg.
Later on we will see that the attractivity gives handy tools for analysing the patients decision
problem. For extensive use of tolerance and attractivety we use notation t{n and tAn to denote
self(t)s perception about self(n)s tolerance and attarctivety, respectively.
Finally, in each period the sole problem for the patient is to maximise Ut by choosing when to
visit a doctor given his perception about future selves behaviour.
Costs We assume that the total costs of the public health care system (PHCS) accrue from two
di¤erent sources: (i) a consultation cost, c^, and (ii) a treatment cost; ct. If a disease is serious the
treatment costs start to increase from a base level, c, after symptoms have lasted more than t+k
periods.26 In other words, when a disease is serious the treatment costs for the health care system
are assumed to be the same from the period when symptoms occur for the rst time, period t, until
period t+k. From period t+k onwards, the treatment costs start to grow up. We thus assume
that while the time to certify severity of a disease is k periods from observing the symptoms the
non-cost-increasing time to visit a doctor is in the interval [t; t + k]. This means that if k < k
and the symptoms were observed in period t the patient should rst wait k periods to be sure that
he really is in need of a doctor and after that there are still k   k periods time to actually visit a
doctor before the treatment costs start to increase.27 For illustrative purposes we use the following
treatment cost function that captures the essential and described properties of the treatment cost
formation
cz =

c, z 2 Nkt
caz k , z 2 N1k
;
26Note the di¤erence between the consultation costs and the consultation fee. The consultation fee is a slice of the
consultation costs and it does not necessarily cover completely those.
27 If k > k; behaviour that would minimise the expected costs involves waiting k periods and then seek for
medical help. We, however, found the assumption k > k implausible, and hence we concentrate only on the cases
where k 2 Nt t+kt t :
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where a > 1 is a constant multiplier, z the period of the visit.
Financing To make clear cut ndings and emphasise important aspects, the structure of an
economy is assumed to be very simple. There are Xt (new born) individuals in each period. In
period t it is only the cohort Xt that is responsible to cover costs from PHCS. This is to say that
the taxes and the fees levied from i 2 Xt are used solely to cover costs that accrue from PHCS in
period t. For simplicity, the tax rate to cover health care costs denes the net-of-tax income level
for all periods.28 For convenience we normalise Xt = 1 for all t:
The government has to nance total costs from PHCS that are denoted here by Kt. The
nancing is through taxation and the fee. The tax, g, the fee, m; and the level of deductible, ;
have to be set so that the following governments periodical budget constraint will be satised.
Kt  Xtgwg + Vtb  It (1  )m
=  + (Vt   It (1  ))m;
where  = wgg is the unit tax per individual, Vt are users of health care system and It are seriously
ill individuals out of Vt in period t.
3 Patients choice
We now turn to analysing the patients behaviour. We will show that for almost any given level
of the consultation fee and the deductible rate the di¤erent types of the patient choose a di¤erent
visiting time.29 This implies that it can be problematic for the government to implement such levels
for the consultation fee and deductible rate that those would lead all patients to behave optimally
from the governments perspective, i.e. in the way that minimises the costs. Hence, the fraction of
each type in the economy is crucial when choosing the levels for the tax, the consultation fee, and
the deductible.
28One can consider this as an imaginary system of a community where members of age n pay taxes to nance a
publicly provided good gn, and the su¢ cient tax rate for all the publicly provided goods is dened solely by su¢ cient
tax rate to cover medical care.
29 In ODonoghue and Rabin (1999) it has been shown that naives are keen to procrastinate and sophisticates to
preproperate onerous task when costs are immediate. However, in their setup there does not exist any uncertainty.
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3.1 Analysis
From the perspective of any self with symptoms, postponing the visit increases the anticipated
possibility to get cured with out visiting a doctor, meaning saved money that can be consumed on
other than medical expenses. At the same time postponing the visit means su¤ering from utility
decreasing e¤ect of symptoms. Finally, a delayed visit decreases the expected total payment from
the visit. It is then clear that about the total e¤ect from postponing the visit it is hard to say
directly anything in terms of expected utility. The following three lemmas shed light on the shape
of the expected intertemporal utility function.
We start by stating the basic characteristics of A't .
Lemma 1 A't is increasing in (i)  and (ii) t; decreasing in (iii) ; and (iv) in s if
" >
Ho(1 t(1 ) t(1 t+1(1 )))
Hs(1 t(1 )) ; where "
 is symptom elasticity of ; i.e. "   0 (s) s ; (v)
8m9 2 (0; 1] such that limt!1A't  m 8'; (vi) 8 2 (0; 1]9m such that limt!1A't < m 8'
Proof. All proofs are consigned to Appendix C
Lemma 1 tells us that the attractivity is bigger for T than for N and S; and that visiting
a doctor rather immediately than in the subsequent period becomes more attractive when time
elapses. Naturally, postponing the visit is the more attractive the bigger is the deductible. An
awkward property is that the attractivety is decreasing in symptoms severity. On the other hand,
this happens only if the change of symptom level has big enough e¤ect on appreciating the near
future. Otherwise, higher symptoms make postponement less attractive. Finally, points (v) and
(vi) in the lemma state that for any level of the fee the government can always choose the rate
of deductible  = 0 to assert that immediate visit is prefered over waiting one extra period for
some self(t). On the other hand, for any positive  the government could set that high fee that the
patient would always nd waiting for one more extra period attractive.
Next Lemma 2 simplies analysis by stating that U't () is single peaked in  2 N1t from a
perspective of self(t), and that if one period waiting is not attractive nor is any longer waiting time.
Together with Lemma 1, these ndings imply that if the fee is not set too high for a given rate of
deductible, the patient will eventually seek for medical help and innitely long delays do not occur.
Lemma 2 (i) if ATt+n < m and A
T
t+n+1  m, then U't (t+ k) < U't (t+ k + 1) 8k  n , ' 2
fT;N; Sg, and U't (t+ k)  U't (t+ k + 1) 8k > n , ' 2 fT;N; Sg;
(ii) if U't (t)  U't (t+ 1), then U't (t)  U't (t+ k) 8k  1.
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What is the import of Lemma (2)? It simply tells us that (i) from self(t)s viewpoint postponing
the visit is monotonically utility increasing for all selves and for all types ' 2 fT;N; Sg until the
period in which T nds for the last time postponing still attractive. This implies one very important
point, namely, if period l is such that it maximises Ts intertemporal utility; then period l is utility
maximising point in time from the perspective of any such self(t) for whom t 2 Nl 1t ; of any type.
Secondly, the lemma tells us that (ii) if one period postponement is not attractive then the patient
considers that there is no reason to wait longer but rather to visit a doctor immediately. In other
words, point (ii) in Lemma (2) characterises the rst step in the patients multistep decision process.
For the rst step the patient solves for the expected utility from one period waiting and if that is
utility increasing he then solves for whether two period waiting would be worthwhile and so on.
The following lemma completes the characteristics of patients decision making.
Lemma 3 (i) If ATt < m and limt!1At ! ;  > m; then {Tt  {'t 8t 2 N1t , ' 2 fN;Sg; and
for {'t <1; {'t is decreasing in t for all ' 2 fT;N; Sg up to n 2 N1t such that {Tn = 0;
(ii) if ATt 1 < m, A
T
t  m; and At < m; then 8' 2 fN;Sg maxn2N0 fn j U't (t+ n)g = 1, and
U't (t+ n)  U't (t+ n+ 1)  0 for all n  1:
Lemma 3 asserts us that until the delay becomes intolerable for T , {Tt = 0, tolerance {
'
t
is decreasing in time for all the types and always lower (or the same) for T than (as) it is for
' 2 fN;Sg, and once {Tt = 0 has been reached
 
ATt  m

the intertemporal utility is always
from Ns and Ss perspective at its maximum level within one period from the ongoing period
(U't (t+ n)  U't (t+ n+ 1)  08n  1). It is exactly this property what makes N and S to pro-
crastinate their visits compared to T . However, as the next propositions show us, procrastination
is not as severe for S as it is for N while the quickest visitor is always T:
Proposition 1 For any pair (m; ) such that limt!1At ! ;  > m, there exists
(i) Tt = t
 + p such that ATt+p 1 < m; A
T
t+p  m;
(ii) Nt = t
 + n such that At+n 1 < m; At+n  m
(iii) Tt  Nt
What is Ss behaviour relative to N and T then? Ss behaviour is di¤erent from Ns due to Ss
correct perception about his future preferences. Self(t) of S and N postpones the visit if and only
if there exists a self who will certainly visit a doctor in tolerable time from self(t)s perspective.
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However, S knows the true future attractivities and tolerances whereas N has completely fallacious
perceptions about those. S takes the future preference reversals into account in the decision making
process and chooses his action strategically conditioned on his future behaviour. From the next
proposition we see Ss realising visiting period relative to T and N:
Proposition 2 For any pair (m; ) such that limt!1At ! ;  > m, we have Tt  St  Nt .
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is the following. T weights the future comparatively more
than S or N and in addition has time-consistent intertemporal preferences. Hence, he visits the
doctor as soon as it is valuable in terms of the expected subjective intertemporal utility. S; from
his part, will always complete the visit within periods that are tolerable from the perspective of his
rst such self for whom the tolerance is nite. Contrary to S, N can delay his visits comparatively
long since after the period that satises AT  m; he anticipates in every period that he will visit
a doctor in a subsequent period with certainty. What really happens is that he does not visit a
doctor before AN  m holds as well:
The most important implication of Proposition 2 is that the set level of the consultation fee
and the deductible rate can results in di¤erent visiting periods for the di¤erent patient types.
From the governments perspective this is problematic. What level they should set for the fee? It is
immediately clear that the fractions of di¤erent types in the economy become crucial when deciding
about the optimal policy. These critical questions will be contemplated in an own section after the
following subsection where, by some numerical examples, we still shed more light on the patients
visiting behaviour.
3.2 Numerical examples
Since the realising visiting period for the patient of type ' can be formally only characterised while
the closed form solutions are in many cases impossible to solve or would not bring any insight
about his behaviour, we rather use numerical methods to illustrate the realising visiting periods for
di¤erent levels of the fee and the deductible.
Throughout the examples in this subsection we set  = 0, since we are here purely keen to
contemplate the e¤ects of m and  on visiting behaviour for di¤erent '. This is to say that tuples
(m; ; ') we use do not necessarely reect the su¢ cient levels from the nancial perspective which
will be studied in the next section. The periodical net-of-tax salary w will be set to unity, the level
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of self-control to  = :8; time-consistent discounting to  = :99; the full health to Ho = 1; the level
of positive symptoms to s = :21, and subjecitve probability for persistence to sub (0jt) = :01:
Finally, we assume that t = 1; i.e. symptoms occur in the rst period: This gives a tuple of xed
parameters: F  (w; ; ;Ho; s; ; t) = (1; :8; :99; 1; :21; :01; 1) : We investigate realising visiting
periods for di¤erent types rst with xed deductible rate and varying fee and then with xed fee
and varying deductible.
3.2.1 Realising visits for xed deductible rate and varying fee
Take F as given and set 1   = :3: Solve then for realising visiting periods for the di¤erent types
with m 2 [0; :9], that is, solve for '1 ; ' 2 fT;N; Sg and m 2 [0; :9]: That results in Figure 1.
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Figure 1 illustrates clearly how N is delaying his visit the most, and that his behaviour is
monotonic in m; just like Ts behaviour is as well. This follows from the fact that any Ns self
considers that his future incarnations will behave like T . Also the characteristics of Ss behaviour
are clearly present in the gure. Since self(1) of S never delays over his tolerance it follows that for
any level of the fee the delays are always kept below (or equal with) the corresponding tolerance
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level. The non-monotonic behaviour then results in. Small changes in the fee a¤ect Ss strategic
behaviour that causes few periods up-and-down di¤erences in the realising visiting period. There
exists a point when delays between N and S start to diverge radically, while Ss trend follows the
trend with Ts, and those di¤erences are not large. In our calibration this happens when the fee
reaches the level of :5:We can say that until a certain level for the fee, behaviour of all the types is
pretty much the same, after that threshold level, increases in the fee cause much longer delays for
N while for S it does not make big changes compared to T:
3.2.2 Realising visits for xed fee and varying deductible rate
Take F as given and set rst m = :3 and then m = :6: Solve then for realising visiting periods for
di¤erent types with  2 [0; :9], that is, solve for '1 ; ' 2 fT;N; Sg and  2 [0; :9]: That results in
Figure 2.
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From this gure we can easily see how the rate of deductible, ; a¤ects realising visiting period.
A direct observation is that decreasing the deductible is more e¢ cient when the fee is higher.
Both subgures also assert that lowering the deductible works as an encouragement to visit a
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doctor sooner, and it is most e¤ective on Ns delays when the has been set relatively fee, and has
approximately an equal e¤ect on all the di¤erent types when the fee has been set relatively low.
4 Governments task
The su¢ ciency of the tax rate was out of consideration in previous. We next add up cost formation
and a su¢ cient tax rate into analysis and contemplate the problem from the governments view-
point. We will see that in this environment resulting su¢ cient tax rates have some very interesting
properties, and that setting the fee and reimbursement is not an easy task in an economy with the
di¤erent patient types.
Without loss of generality, we assume from now on that if an individual in Xt is subject to get
sick then t = t:30
Consider period t and denote by Pt those individuals in Xt who are having symptoms, and
those who are having serious disease by Dt. By the assumptions, we have Pt = Xt =  and
Dt = Pt = :
31
The timing is following. The government rst sets the consultation fee, the deductible and the
tax rate. Then those individuals who have symptoms make their decicion whether to visit a doctor
now or later. Finally, the costs accrue from those who visit the doctor during the period and after
sorting out the incomes and costs the budget will be in balance, surplus, or decit.
4.1 Dening a su¢ cient tax level
Costs In the governments budget constraint
Kt  Xt + (Vt   It (1  ))m
=  + (Vt   It (1  ))m;
the total costs, Kt; and the quality of Vt and It depends on behaviour of those who are having
symptoms. By the quality we mean how long an incoming patient has possibly waited before
30Recall that the subscript t in Xt refers to a cohort born in period t.
31Recall the notation and normalisation: we have normalised Xt = 18t 2 N, Vt denotes the patients visiting
medical center in period t and It denotes seriously ill out of Vt:
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seeking for medical help. We can write Kt in the following general form
Kt = Vtc^+ ItcIt ;
where cIt refers to treatment costs that is a function of time waiting time, i.e. how long seriously
ill patients, Its; have delayed their visits. Treatment costs is also a function of the structure of Its.
This structure, from its half, depends on the structure of each Xt, that is, on the fractions of N ,
S, and T in the economy. Denote the fraction of type ' by ': Then, we have a partition of Xt as
}t = fN ; S ; T g where T = 1  S   N .
From the governments viewpoint there are three di¤erent cost-gategories in which an incoming
patient p can belong. Those are: a gategory in which (i) the probability for a serious disease is less
than 1 and treatment costs are minimised in the case of serious disease; (ii) the probability for a
serious disease is 1 and treatment costs are minimised; (iii) the probability for a serious disease is
1 and treatment costs have started to increase. For each described p, it holds respectively that: (i)
't 2 Nt
+k
t , (ii) 
'
t 2 Nt
+k
t+k+1, (iii) 
'
t 2 N1t+k+1. For those who are subject to visit before
(k + 1)th period after t there is a  probability that they really have a serious disease. On the
other hand, out of those who plan to visit later than k periods after the occurrence of symptoms,
only the fraction  really visits a doctor at some point, since the fraction 1   have cured by itself
during periods t + d, d 2 Nk1 : Within any type group all the patients are identical. We thus get
the following three expected total cost groups that are net-of-reimbursement:
B't =
8>>><>>>:
' (c^+ c  (1   (1  ))m) ; if 't 2 Nt
+k
t ;
' (c^+ c  m) ; if 't 2 Nk

t+k+1;
'
 
c^+ ca
' (t+k)   m ; if 't 2 N1t+k+1:
Hence, the total expected net-of-reimbursement costs caused by cohort Xt during its lifetime are
simply the sum of B't s over the types ': Formally,
Bt =
X
'
B't : (2)
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Tax For any m > 0 and  2 [0; 1]; the level of the tax must then satisfy
Vtc^+ ItcIt   + (Vt   It (1  ))m
,  = Vt (c^ m) + It (cIt + (1  )m) :
Finally, since the tax a¤ects patientsbehaviour, the solution for the previous equation will be a
xed point, ; that satises the following equality.
 = Vt (;m; ) (c^ m) + It (;m; ) (cIt (;m; ) + (1  )m) : (3)
Then, due to normalisation Xt = 1 8t and since all the cohorts are identical, we directly get the
su¢ cient tax level for the steady-state from Eq.(2) by setting Bt equal to :32 We have
 = Bt
From now on, we assume that the government knows that there can be exactly three di¤erent
individual types, i.e. they know 'i 2 fT;N; Sg for all i:We also assume that the government knows
the exact preferences for each type, i.e. they know the correct U't for each '. Now, for any pair
(m; ) ; the su¢ cient tax level  will depend on }: This means that if the government knows }; it
will be able to set the equilibrium tax level  for any pair (m; ). If it does not know the correct
}; problems will emerge as we will see after the next subsection.
4.2 Social planners problem
As we are having hyperbolic inviduals in our economy, a typical question arises: Whose utility
the social planner should maximise? In here, we take the appoach discussed in ODonoghue and
Rabin (2003, 2006) and we think that the social planner takes the viewpoint of self(t   1) when
maximising the expected utility of a cohortXt . This is to say that no matter whether the individual
inXt is having hyperbolic or exponential preferences taking the viewpoint of self(t   1) guarantees
that from that perspective the only correct discounting from period t onwards is the exponential
32As we mentioned  is the tax rate in the steady-state, and in fact, we omit here the problem about nancing
the transition phase.
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one.
The governments task is then to choose optimally the fee-deductible pair (m; ) resulting in 
that maximises a weighted sum of expected intertemporal utilities subject to a balanced budget,
where weighs, '; are from an assumed partition of }:The social planner then solves
max
fm;g
8<:X
'2
'U't =
X
'2
'

(1  ) w (
)
1   Ho + Gt
9=; (4)
s.t. Kt   + (Vt   It (1  ))m;
where Gt is an expected intertemporal utility for an individual who meets the symptoms, and it
takes the following form:
Gt =
hP't t
n=0 
nw ()  't tm (1   (1  ))
i
Hs +


'
t t
+1
w()
1  HohP'
t t
n=0 
nw ()  't tm
i
Hs +


'
t t
+1
w()
1  Ho
if 't 2 Nt
+k
t
if 't 2 N1t+k+1
:
Before analysing the problems what the government can meet when pursuing , we shortly
illustrate numerically how the tax rate depends on set levels of m and  for a correct partition of
}:
Su¢ cient tax level for (m; ) For numerical illustration of the interaction between the tax rate
and di¤erent levels of (m; ) ; we use the same calibration as in Subsection 3.2. We thus use the
tuple of xed parameters: F  (wg; ; ;Ho; s; ; t) = (1; :8; :99; 1; :21; :01; 1) ; but now we have to
complete it with partition } = fN ; S ; T g, the consultation cost c^, the base level treatment cost
c, and constant a: We set ' = 13 for all ' 2 fT;N; Sg; c^ = 2; c = 160; and a = 1:1: Finally, we
have to give a values for the time during which the seriousness of the disease is uncertain i.e. k.,
and for the time when the treatment costs start to increase, i.e. k: We set k = 10; and k = 15:
Redening F yields
F  (wg; ; ;Ho; s; ; t; }; c^; c; a; k; k)
=

1; :8; :99; 1; :21; :01; 1; f1
3
;
1
3
;
1
3
g; 2; 160; 1:1; 10; 15

:
Let then m 2 [0; :5] while the deductible takes the values  2 f0; :3; :6; :9g; and solve for :
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This results in Figure 3.
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From Figure 3 we can see that increasing the deductible rate (lowering the reimbursement rate)
has a tendency to increase the tax rate after certain level of the fee. On the other hand, one can
notice that increasing the deductible causes actually the patient to delay with lower levels of the
fee, and so gives a possibility to lower the tax rate once some part of incoming patients have waited
more than k periods after symptoms occurred. Very improtant nding is that if the fee is set
high enough, increasing the fee does not any longer decrease the tax rate but increases it. This is
exactly the e¤ect that is caused by unnecessary long delays. Moreover, if also the deductible rate is
increased in this region, necessary tax increase will be even greater. If the government did not know
partition } the social planner might consider that increasing either m or  or both would lower the
tax rate. However, the realisation is completely opposite and the government is actually forced to
increase the tax rate. Once this happens the social planner might still consider that levels for m
and  are too low leading the government to increase them even more which again would result in
even higher tax rate. As it is heavily present in the gure, the lowest tax rate will be attained with
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the lowest possible fee if  is set very high. On the other hand, this tax rate level is kept easiest on
the cost of higher fee if the deductible  is set as low as 0:
We next contemplate the possible problems that the social planner can face if it does not have
full information about }.
4.3 Choosing (m; ) can be problematic
We now turn to analyse the problems that the social planner faces when trying to solve the problem
given in Eq.(4) : As we mentioned earlier, the social planner solves Eq.(4) with an assumed partition
of }: In here we mainly focus on contemplating what happens when this assumption fails to hold.
Basically, the social planner considers rst the partition }; and then for all the given parameters
he solves for pair (m; ) to maximise Eq.(4) : Choosing the pair (m; ) that is based on an assumed
}; denoted from now on by }A; results in an equilibrium tax level A that will be set, naturally,
at the same time with (m; ) : To make discussion easier let us denote this tuple by
 
m; ; A

where A = 
 
m; ; }A

: Once the tuple
 
m; ; A

has been implemented it then results in a
level for total costs that is a correlative of a real }. If }A 6= } it can happen that the budget
decit, negative or positive, occur.33 An interesting question is then what is the governments best
response on that, i.e. will they change the fee, the deductibe, or the tax, or some combination of
the previous, and what the chosen response can then a¤ect for its part.
For convenience we assume that true distribution is } = f 13 ; 13 ; 13g (= #7) while the false distri-
butions that the social planner is using are as follows34
}A 
8>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>:
f1; 0; 0g "Conventional" (#1)
f0; 1; 0g "OR" (#2)
f0; 0; 1g "Laibson" (#3)
f 12 ; 12 ; 0g "Near-OR" (#4)
f0; 12 ; 12g "OR-Laibson" (#5)
f 12 ; 0; 12g "Near-Laibson" (#6)
;
where Conventional refers to conventional assumption of  = 1; OR to ODonoghue and Ra-
33Notice that even if by coincidence A =  for }A 6= }; the utility is not necessarily at its maximum level, and
hence the equilibrium will be only suboptimal.
34The notation #n; n 2 f1; 2; :::; 7g; is just for numbering the assumptions }A.
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bins mostly assumed frameworks with assumption of only-naifs with  6= 1, Laibson to Laibsons
mostly used frameworks of only-sophisticates with  6= 1; Near-OR to population with half-half
time-consistents and time-inconsistents naifs, OR-Laibson to half-half naifs and sophisticates time-
inconsistent, and nally Near-Laibson to half-half time-consitents and time-inconsistent sophisti-
cates. For all other parameters the following calibration holds
F  (wg; ; ;Ho; s; ; ; c^; c; a; k; k)
= (1; :8; :99; 1; :21; :01; 2; 160; 1:1; 10; 15) :
The following table shows us the solutions for the social planners task given the di¤erent }As.
It also shows the actual budget balancing tax levels for chosen target m and target , i.e. given
target m and target  for assumed }A the su¢ cient budget balancing tax level is  that would
locally maximise Eq. (4) and balance the budget at the same time for true } = f 13 ; 13 ; 13g.
}A Target m Target  Target  Su¢ cient 
1 :5 :9 :0162 :0825
2 :3 :9 :0162 :0274
3 :4 :7 :0162 :0215
4 :9 0 :0216 :0198
5 :5 :3 :0162 :0211
6 :9 :2 :0162 :0354
7 :9 0 :0198 :0198
Table 1: Target levels of m,  and  and correct balancing level of  for di¤erent }A
It is remarkable that target  is the same for almost all }A while the fee and the level of
deductible varies across }A: The similarity of the target levels is a follow up from the fact that tax
rate  = :0162 is the lowest attainable tax level for the given parametrisation such that if }A were
the true distribution, all the patients with symptoms could be manipulated to wait the optimal time
and after that to seek medical help within the time of that would minimise the treatment costs and
hence minimise the expected total costs. Note also that due to the construction of the set up, we
can immediately see from the di¤erences between the target and su¢ cient tax rate levels whether
the budget will be in balance or not. The biggest decit is caused when Conventional distribution
is assumed and the smallest when Near-OR is assumed. Finally, if the social planner assumed by
coincidence }A = }; then m would be relatively high while the suggested deductible rate would
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be 0: Hence, the optimal policy in full knowledge case would be to punish those quite hard who
preproperate seeking medical help while rewarding generously those who have waited the optimal
time when seeking medical help.
Table 1 gives us the starting point to contemplate the governments attempts to balance the
budget. As we now know that the budget will not be in balance with values where the assumption of
distribution } is false the govenrnment must try to balance it. In here we will consider four possible
corrective policies and their consequence: balancing the budget with changing (i) the fee; (ii) the
deductible; and (iii) the tax level, and nally (iv) balancing the budget with all three balancing
mechanism with di¤erent combinations of the fee, the deductible, and the tax, i.e. rst with the
fee, then if there is still decit then with the tax, or rst with the deductible and if there is still
decit then with the tax, or with all three in order of rst with the fee, then with the deductible
and nally with the tax. These corrective adjustment policies or treatments are denominated here
by (i) ma or m  only, (ii) a or    only, (iii) a or    only and (iv) saa, and sa!zaa, where
s; z 2 fm; ; g; s 6= z depending on whether there are used one or two adjustment treatments
before balancing the budget with the tax:
4.3.1 Balancing the budget
Let us start with an assumption }A 6= }. For our parametrisation the assumption implies immedi-
ately,
A 6= Bt =
X
'
B't ;
and hence the budget will not be in balance. We assume that the government xes two out of the
three following variables
 
m; ; A

while they try to balance the budget by changing the non-
xed variable, referred here by choice variable. We will consider the following adjustment scheme:
if there is decit after setting the targets then the government increases the choice variable if and
only if it resulted in lower decit in the previous period or if the previous period was the target
setting period, otherwise they decrease the varible; if decreasing the variable increases the decit
then the government increases the varible, and vice versa. All the increases and decreases are made
by some rule so that the varible converges to the value that (locally) minimises the decit during
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100 rounds.35
Results We have collected the main results in the following Table 2 and two gures, Figure 4 and
Figure 5. Table 2 describes convergence results for all possible treatments while Figure 4 shows the
same information in plotted diagram and Figure 5 the utility comparisons for using the di¤erent
budget balancing treatments and assumptions about }:
}A mt ma t a ma 
a  t a ma!aa maa aa
1 :5 :5243 :9 :623 :7239 :0162 :0825 :0434 :0999 :0403
2 :3 :3931 :9 1 :9003 :0162 :0274 :0406 :0406 :0274
3 :4 :4648 :7 :878 :7001 :0162 :0215 :0404 :0404 :0406
4 :9 :81 0 0 0 :0216 :0198 :0201 :0201 :0198
5 :5 :51 :3 :3187 :3011 :0162 :0211 :026 :026 :0216
6 :9 :9213 :2 :1687 :2002 :0162 :0354 :0378 :0378 :0162
7 :9 :9 0 0 0 :0198 :0198 :0198 :0198 :0198
Table 2: Target and convergence levels for di¤erent adjustment treatments.
From Table 2 and Figure 4 we see that the target values fail to hold almost for all treatments
and assumptions about }: This is, of course, just a natural consequence from the fact that for all
}A di¤erent from True the target values are set by assuming such patient behaviour that will not
realise. Hence, fallacious assumption about }A leads to falsely set (m; ; ) which, for its part,
causes patients to visits a doctor too soon or too late from the governments viewpoint. Thus,
with the target values, the budget will not be in balance and there will be a need of using some
adjustment scheme. From Table 2 we also see whether the single adjustment balances the budget
or is there a need to use another adjustment instrument in addition. This can be seen by inspecting
whether za and zasa yields the same value for sa; where z 6= s; z; s 2 fm; ; g; and if it does
not yield the same value then the budget can not be balanced by using only a single adjustment
treatment.
35We want to emphasise that due to non-monotonic behaviour of sophisticates there can be locally minimising
points where the level of choice value starts to converge. That is, for some level of the fee sophisticates will choose to
wait while if the fee is increased they will visit a doctor immediately. Hence, it depends on the initial values where
the balancing sequence converges.
It is also reasonable to note here, that it is possible that the convergence is not necessarily complete but there
can be some decit even after balancing scheme is completed.
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For the fee adjustment there is only a small di¤erence between the target value and the con-
vergence values if the planner assumes Conventional, OR-Laibson or Near-Laibson distributions.
With all fee adjustment schemes and for all distributions, except Near-OR, the convergence value
is higher than the target value and budget also stays unbalanced. For the deductible adjustment
schemes, a diverges from the target  for Conventional, OR, Laibson distributions while it follows
the target quite accurately for the all other assumed distributions. There is also very clear pattern
that either the fee is high and the deductible low or vice versa. The fraction of naifs in assumed
partition steers the targets so that the more there are naifs assumed relative to other types the
lower the fee is set to avoid unnecessary long and expensive delays while at the same time the
level of deductible must be set relatively high to prevent too early and unnecessary visits. On the
other hand, the more sophisticates and time-consistents are assumed to belong in the partition the
harder the puhishmentfrom an unnecessary visit becomes, i.e. the fee is substantially high, while
the reimbursement for the necessary visits covers almost the whole fee. For the tax adjustment
schemes, the target tax is almost always set to lower level than what will be attained after adjust-
ment procedure. For Conventional distribution the biggest di¤erence between the target level and
the convergence value is with maa procedure that is nearly 900% higher tax rate compared to the
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target, while the smallest di¤erence is for Near-OR with any tax adjustment treatment which is
also the only assumed partition for which the target is actually higher than the resulting tax level
after an adjustment scheme. Compared to other adjustment schemes, the tax adjustment results in
higher di¤erences from the target values. That is an obvious consequence of possibly unbalanced
budget that can be balanced only by using the tax adjustment in addition. It is notable that the
tax a¤ects all individuals while the fee and the deductible only patients. We nd that aa results
in the lowest attainable tax rates that are actually also budget balancing solutions. This means
that after choosing the targets, the social planner should keep the fee intact while letting the de-
ductible rst balance the budget and if that does not balance the budget completely then complete
the balancing by adjusting with the tax. Only for Laibson, keeping the deductible xed instead of
xing the fee results in lower tax rate after adjusting also with the tax than what aa does. This
feature is clearly present in the following Figure 5.
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Figure 5 provides utility comparisons between the di¤erent adjustment schemes and the di¤erent
distribution assumptions. The utility corresponds are calculated by using the True distribution and
are based on realising behaviour. The rst thing that one might wonder in Figure 5 is that why the
assumption of True does not result in the highest expected intertemporal utility but it happens in
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the case for which the assumed distribution is Near-Laibson and the adjustment is rst made with
the deductible and continued with the tax adjustment is used: This peculiarity is not a mistake
but follows from the non-monotonic behaviour of sophisticastes that causes local equilibria and
sometimes also invisibility of some better equilibria. The reasoning follows. When the social
planner solves for target m; ; and  that maximises the expected intertemporal utility given in
Eq.(4) he rst makes the assumption }A: After that he calculates the xed point  (m; ) for each
pair (m; ) by starting the iteration from the current tax rate that is the su¢ cient tax rate in the
case where all patients visit a doctor immediately after observing the symptoms. After solving the
tuple (m; ; ) for each selected pair (m; ) ; the target m; , and  (m; ) are set by choosing the
tuple (m; ; ) that maximises Eq.(4) for an assumed }A: He then implements the chosen (m; ; )
and after the rst period observes whether the budget is in balance or not. If it is not in balance he
chooses the treatment to balance the budget. But now, the initial values for the adjustment schemes
are the originally implemented values, i.e. the target values, that can depend on }A: Then, the
same adjustment scheme with di¤erent initial values can actually lead to di¤erent budget balancing
equilibria that can be such that they were not reached when selecting the target values. This is
exactly what happens in our calibration. The all-visit-tax-rate is now such that when assumed
distribution is True, the target values, which are now also the equilibrium values since }A = };
that are supposed to maximise the expected intertemporal utility do not maximise the expected
intertemporal utility globally but rather locally. Hence, it is a pure coincidence that assuming
(incorrectly) Near-Laibson instead of True results in such target values that when adjusting the
implemented fee, the deductible and the tax rate to balance the budget the iteration leads to a
betterequilibrium that would not have been found if True had been assumed when iterating the
target values.
Assuming distribution Conventional results in, in general, lower expected intertemporal utilities
than what assuming other distributions would do. The adjustment with the tax only and rst with
the deductible and then with the tax results in the highest utilities. It is also appararent from the
gure that when the true distribution includes naifs but the choice is made by assuming that there
are no naifs at all, i.e. by assuming distiributions Conventional, Laibson, and Near-Laibson, the
intertemporal utilties are always lower than when the existence of naifs is assumed. This happens
since not assuming the existence of naifs leads to relatively high tax rates due to unexpected costs
from naifsdelayed visits. High tax rates do then hurt not only patients but all individual, and
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hence decreases the expected intertemporal utility. On the other hand, assuming that only naifs
exist while dropping out either the existence of sophisticates or time-consistents or both, lead always
to higher utility level than what it is in the case where the existence of naifs is dropped out. The
reasoning is the same as in previous but now its the opposite, the budget balancing tax rates are
now relatively lower and hence the expected intertemporal utility higher. We can then say that
assuming the existence of naifs never a¤ects the targets so that when balancing the budget the
resulting equilibrium does not cause time-consitents or sophisticates to behave harmfully for the
system, while if naifs are not assumed then the budget balancing equilibrium hurts naifs by letting
them to delay their visits to doctor and hence by the higher tax rate those delays can be seen as a
negative externality for the whole system.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have concentrated on studying the patient behaviour of hyperbolic individuals.
While a time-consitent patient always seeks medical help in reasonable time we have seen that
when also hyperbolic patients exist the optimal level of a consultation fee, deductible for it and
a budget balancing tax rate can be very problematic to set. The problems follow from the fact
that the di¤erent patient types choose di¤erent times to visit a doctor. If the di¤erence between
visiting times di¤ers alot across the patient types then treatment costs and their formation become
important. As the treatment cost can increase very fast in time after certain threshold, it is crucial
for the public health care system that unnecessary long delays do not exist before seeking medical
care. On the other hand, unnecessary visits to a medical centre can, as well, cause an incresase in
total costs of the system. Hence, the level of the fee, the deductible and the tax rate should be such
that all the types wait long enough but not too long, when the costs from the system are nanced
by the fee and the tax.
In this paper the consultation fee makes an individual who meets symptoms to wait, while the
deductible should make an individual willing to visit a doctor when he is sure that he really is in
need of a doctor. The patients mechanism to certify himself about severity of a disease follows
from a subjective probability that increases along the passage of time or then the symptoms vanish
away which drops the probability to zero level.
The results establish that fairly small increases (decreases) in the fee (the deductible) can cause
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substantial changes in patients behaviour. Naifs are a¤ected the most and actually their delays can
become so long that a decrease (increase) instead of an increase (decrease) in the fee (the deductible)
would decrease the total costs from the system and hence the tax rate resulting in higher expected
intertemporal utility from social planners viewpoint. For sophisticates and time-consistents it is
more important to make them wait long enough with a high fee and then reward them with low
deductible than to certify them to visit a doctor. For naifs, instead, it is more important to make
them to visit a doctor soon enough with low fee and reminding them about unnecessary visit with
high level of the deductible than to certify them to wait long enough. Finally, when all the types
of patients do exist, assuming the existence of naifs is more important than assuming some other
patients type existence, as assuming the absence of naifs can hurt sophisticates, time-consitents
and all individuals with unnecessary high tax rates while assuming the absence of time-consistents
or sophisticates does not hurt naifs in similar way and tax rates stay comparably low resulting in
comparably higher expected intertemporal utility.
What is the true partition of naifs, sophisticates and time-consistents in the real world is nat-
urally impossible to know. However, as is it plausible to assume that there are to a certain extent
all those types, in the light of the results from this study, we should always conduct the policies
for the public health care system so that naifs play the leading role. We should thus consider the
possible behavioural e¤ects of using scal instruments in health care more deeply than what it is
currently done, since an assumption of the conventional partition for the individuals in the econ-
omy can actually lead to more expensive and worse situation than to what an assumption of the
inconventional partition would lead us.
Appendix
A Expected intertemporal utilities
Take the viewpoint of self(t). A subjective probability that he is still sick in period t+ n  1 is
Rt;n 1  tt+1:::t+n 2;
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Then, a subjective probability that he cures without visiting a doctor between periods t + n   1
and t+ n is
1  t+n 1:
Hence, the probability for being sick until t+ n  1 and then getting cured without the visit is
Pt;n 
 
tt+1:::t+n 2
  
1  t+n 1

:
Whit this scenario the patient has intertemporal utility that is
U't (curet+n) 
 
1 +  (s; ')
n 1X
=1

!
wHs +  (s; ')
nwHo
1   :
In a scenario where the patient seeks for medical help in period t + n, he is sick until that period
producing intertemporal utility of  
1 +  (s; ')
n 1X
=1

!
wHs:
while his expected instantaneous utility from that period is 
w  m  t+n +  1  t+nHs;
and from that period onwards the utility is given by
 (s; ')
n+1wHo
1   :
Putting these utilities together we get an intertemporal utility for self(t)
U't (seekt+n) 
 
1 +  (s; ')
n 1X
=1

!
wHs
+ (s; ') n
 
w  m  t+n +  1  t+nHs +  (s; ') n+1wHo1   :
Naturally, the probability assigned to this scenario is Rt;n:
We are then ready to write out the fullexpected intertemporal utility for self(t) in a case where
he considers to visit a doctor in period t+n and takes it into account that he might get cured before
that period. This utility is denoted by U't (t+ n) ; where superscript refers to the type, subscript
to the viewpoint and t+ n to the period of the planned visit. We get
U't (t+ n) 
nX
z=1
Pt;zU
'
t (curet+z) +Rt;nUt (seekt+n) ;
where the rst term on the right hand side is the expected utility from the cases where the would
not be needed while the second term represents the expected utility from the visit in period t+ n
conditional on having the symptoms still present.
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B Derivation of attractivity
Self(t) would like to postpone the visit at least one period if
U't (t) < U
'
t (t+ 1)
, (w   (1  t)m  tm)Hs + 
1X
=1
wHo <
wHs + 
"
t
"
(
 
w    t+1 +  1  t+1mHs + 1X
=2
wHo
#
+ (1  t)
1X
=1
wHo
#
, wHs  m ((1  t) + t)Hs + 
1X
=1
wHo <
wHs + twHs   t
 
t+1 +
 
1  t+1

mHs
+t
1X
=2
wHo + (1  t)
1X
=1
wHo
,  m ((1  t) + t)Hs < twHs   t
 
t+1 +
 
1  t+1

mHs   twHo
, m ((1  t) + t)Hs > tws+ t
 
t+1 +
 
1  t+1

mHs
, m  (1  t) + t   t  t+1 +  1  t+1Hs > tws
, m > tws 
(1  t) + t   t
 
t+1 +
 
1  t+1

Hs
, m > tws 
1  t (1  )  t
 
1  t+1 (1  )

Hs
 A't
C Proofs
C.1 Lemma (1)
Proof. (i) Derivate A't w.r.t. .
(ii) We have to show that At is increasing in t . To do this we have to show that @At@t > 0; where
At is dened by the following equation
At =
tws 
1  t (1  )  t
 
1  t+1 (1  )

Hs
:
Assume that symptoms occur in period t for the rst time. Recall then that n = 
1
n+1 is increasing
in n, and that n is the time distance from t: For all s > 0 s and Hs are redundant for the derivative
with respect to ; hence set Hss = 1 and rewrite
At =
tw 
1  t (1  )  t
 
1  t+1 (1  )
 :
Now it is clear that when t increases the numerator increases. We are thus done if we are able to
show, as a su¢ cient condition, that the denominator decreases in t: Elaborate the denominator in
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as follows  
1  t (1  )  t
 
1  t+1 (1  )

= 1  t (1  )  t + tt+1 (1  )  Bt:
Note that
@(t+1)
 1
@t
=   1
(t+ 1)
2 
(t+1) 1 ln :
Now,
@Bt
@t
= (1  ) 1
(t+ 1)
2 t ln + 
1
(t+ 1)
2 t ln 
  (1  ) t+1
1
(t+ 1)
2 t ln    (1  ) t
1
(t+ 2)
2 t+1 ln 
= t
 
(1  ) 1
(t+ 1)
2 + 
1
(t+ 1)
2    (1  ) t+1
1
(t+ 1)
2    (1  )
1
(t+ 2)
2 t+1
!
ln 
= t|{z}
>0
0BBB@(1  ) 1(t+ 1)2    (1  ) t+1 1(t+ 1)2| {z }
>0
+ 
1
(t+ 1)
2    (1  )
1
(t+ 2)
2 t+1| {z }
>0
1CCCA ln |{z}
<0
< 0;
which completes the proof.
(iii) Derivate A't w.r.t. .
(iv) Denote
tws 
1  t (1  )  t
 
1  t+1 (1  )
| {z }
D
Hs
 At = Bt s
Hs
;
then the e¤ect of the level of symptoms is given by the following derivative
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;
where " =   s0 is the s symptom elasticity. The derivative @At@s is then positive if
" <
HoD
(Ho   s) (1  t (1  ))
(5)
and otherwise negative.
(v) Notice and denote limt!1A
'
t =
()ws
Hs(1 )   ( () ; ) ; since by points (i) and (iii) A
'
t
is increasing in  while decreasing in ; let  () < 1: Then, for any  () 2 (0; 1] we have lim
!0 ( () ; ) =1.
(vi) Fix  = ^; ^ 2 (0; 1]; then  ( () ; ^) = ()ws^Hs(1 ) < 1 for any  () 2 (0; 1]: Choose m >
 ( () ; ^) to complete:
C.2 Lemma (2)
Proof. We rst prove (ii) and then (i) :
(ii) Let us prove even stronger claim: if U't (t)  U't (t+ 1), then Ut (t+ n)   Ut (t+ n+ 1)  0
8n  1: By transitivity then also U't (t)  U't (t+ k) 8k  1; k 2 N, and we are done. For
notational ease let us denote U't () = Ut () for ' 2 fN;Sg: Assume that U't (t)  U't (t+ 1) ;
and ' 2 fN;Sg: This implies Ut (seekt)  tUt (curet+1) + (1  t)Ut (seekt+1) : By Lemma (1)
Ut (t)   Ut (t+ 1) is increasing in t, hence 0  Ut (t)   Ut (t+ 1) < Ut+k (t+ k)   Ut+k (t+ k + 1)
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8k  1. Choose an arbitrary n  1:
Ut (t+ n)  Ut (t+ n+ 1)
= Rt;nUt (seekt+n)  Pt;n+1Ut (curet+n+1) Rt;n+1Ut (seekt+n+1)
= Rt;n

Ut (seekt+n)  Pt;n+1
Rt;n
Ut (curet+n+1)  Rt;n+1
Rt;n
Ut (seekt+n+1)

= Rt;n
 
Ut (seekt+n) 
 
1  t+n

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
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 
Ut (seekt+n) 
  
1  t+n

Ut (curet+n+1) + t+nUt (seekt+n+1)

= Rt;n
n
 
Ut (seekt+n)
n
 
  
1  t+n

Ut (curet+n+1) + t+nUt (seekt+n+1)

n
!
 Rt;nn (L M) ;
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n
+ wHs
+
 
w  m  t+n+1 +  1  t+n+1Hs +  2wHo1  
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ wHs
+
 
w  m  t+n+1 +  1  t+n+1Hs +  2wHo1   + wHs   wHs
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
  wHs (1  ) + Ut+n (seekt+n+1)
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ UTt+n (seekt+n+1) :
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Thus,   
1  t+n

Ut (curet+n+1) + t+nUt (seekt+n+1)

n
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+
 
1  t+n

wHs + 
wHo
1  

+t+n

wHs + 
 
w  m  t+n+1 +  1  t+n+1Hs +  2wHo1  

=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
  wHs (1  )
+
 
1  t+n

Ut+n (curet+n+1) + t+nUt+n (seekt+n+1)
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
  wHs (1  ) + Ut+n (t+ n+ 1)
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ UTt+n (t+ n+ 1) :
On the other hand, we have
Ut (seekt+n)
n
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ 
 
w  m  t+n +  1  t+nHs +  wHo1  
=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ 
 
w  m  t+n +  1  t+nHs + wHo1  

=

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ UTt+n (t+ n) :
Hence,
Ut (t+ n)  Ut (t+ n+ 1)
= Rt;n
n (L M)
= Rt;n
n
0@

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
+ UTt+n (t+ n) 

1 + 
Pn 1
=1 


wHs
n
  UTt+n (t+ n+ 1)
1A
= Rt;n
n
 
UTt+n (t+ n)  UTt+n (t+ n+ 1)
  0;
which completes the proof, since n was chosen arbitrarily.
(i)AssumeATt+n < m andA
T
t+n+1  m:Notice that assumption implies UTt+n (t+ n) < UTt+n (t+ n+ 1)
and UTt+n+1 (t+ n+ 1)  UTt+n+1 (t+ n+ 2). Choose an arbitrary k 2 f1; :::; ng: From the proof of
(ii) we get
Ut (t+ k)  Ut (t+ k + 1) = Rt;kk
 
UTt+k (t+ k)  UTt+k (t+ k + 1)

< 0;
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since A'l is increasing in l, i.e. U
'
l (l)   U'l (l + 1) is increasing in l; and we assumed that
UTt+n (t+ n)   UTt+n (t+ n+ 1) < 0: For the case k > n the proof is analogous. Again, since k
was chosen arbitrarily the proof is completed.
C.3 Lemma (3)
Proof. (i) Assume ATt < m and limt!1A
T
t ! ;  > m, and let l = maxn2N0

UTt (t+ n)
	
> t:
Denote 't;n = U
'
t (t+ n)   U't (t+ n+ 1) and remark that from the proof of Lemma (2) we get
't;n = Rt;n
n (s; ')
 
UTt+n (t+ n)  UTt+n (t+ n+ 1)

= Rt;n
n (s; ')Tt+n;0 for n  1. Dene
Rt;0  1: Notice that
't;n is decreasing in n when t + n < l and increasing in t when t + n  l:
Hence, Ut (t+ n) is concave in n when t + n < l: Notice then that
't;0 is decreasing in t when
t < l: We thus have jUt (t)  Ut (l)j is decreasing in t  l: Dene then St;p  Ut (t)  Ut (t+ p) and
notice St;p =
Pp
n=0t;n: By the denition of tolerance we have {
'
t = maxfpjSt;p < 0g: Without
loss of generality, let k be for self(t) such that St;k = 0: Thus, {t = k   1: Now, since
't;n is
increasing in t when t + n  l it immediately follows that {'t+1 < {'t ; and further, since St;p is
increasing in t; {t+n 1 < {t+n 8n 2 Nl t 10 : Finally, since St;p is increasing also in  it then follows
that {Tt  {'t for ' 2 fN;Sg and for all t:
(ii) Notice that 't;n < 0 8n  1 for ' 2 fN;Sg if Tt+n;0 > 0: On the other hand Tt+n;0 > 0 if
ATt+n < m. A
T
t+n < m implies A
T
t < 0 since At is increasing in t: Finally, if 
'
t;n < 0 and 
T
t;0 > 0
then 't;0 < 0 and 
'
t;n  0 8n ; and hence maxn2N0 fU't (t+ n)g = 1:
C.4 Propostition (1)
Proof. (i) Let p be such that ATt+p 1 < m; A
T
t+p  m: ATt+p  m implies {Tt+p+n = 0 8n 2 N0.
Without loss of generality, assume that ATt+p = m; then by using Lemma 2 and 3 it is easy to show
that t  minf{'t g = t+ p  t 8t 2 Nt
+p 1
t is strictly decreasing in t. Then clearly 
T
t+n = d for
all n 2 Np 10 and Tt+n = v for n = p: Thus Tt = t + p;
(ii) Let p be such that ATt+p 1 < m; A
T
t+p  m: Without loss of generality, assume again that
ATt+p = m: Then by Lemma 1 At+p < A
T
t+p = m. Since At+p < m, {Nt+p  1; and by
Lemma 3 {Nt+p 1  {Nt+p: Since i{Nj = {Tj for all i < j and t is strictly decreasing in t and
we have Nt+n = d for all n 2 Np 20 . In addition, t+p+n 1{Nt+p+n = 0 8n 2 N0 which implies
that also Nt+p 1 = d and 
N
t+p = d: Thus, 
N
t  t + p + 1: Finally, Nt+h = v if and only if
ANt+h  m for some h; implying {Nt+h = 0: Since At is increasing in  h  p: Such h exists since
limt!1At ! ;  > m by the assumption, and A'j is increasing in j: To complete, denote h by n;
hence Nt = t
 + n: If ATt+p 1 < m; A
T
t+p > m; and A
N
t+p  m; we have Tt = Nt :
(iii) The points (i) and (ii) ) Nt = t + n = t + h  t + p = Tt :
C.5 Proposition (2)
Proof. Let p and n be such that ATt+p 1 < m; A
T
t+p  m and At+n 1 < m; At+n  m; n  p.
Proposition 1 (iii) gives us Tt  Nt : Now, {Nj = {Sj 8j 2 N: By the denition Sj = v if and
only if there does not exist a self(i > j) in tolerable time for whom Si = v; while by the proof of
1 we have Nj = v if and only if A
N
j  m: Due to {Nj = {Sj 8j 2 N, we have St = Nt = t + n if
and only if {St+n i  i 8i 2 Nn1 : By the proof of Lemma 3 it is easy to show that if {t+n 2 = 1
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then necessarily {t+n 1 = 1: From this it follows that self(t + n  2) completes the visit since
self(t + n  1) would postpone it due to {t+n = 0. We have thus shown St+n 2 = v while
Nt+n 2 = d; which implies 
S
t  Nt since clearly 't+n j = d 8j 2 Nn3 ;8'fN;Sg:
To proove Tt  St we use Lemma 3(i). (I) Consider rst the case n = p: Then, {'p = 0, and hence
'p = v 8' 2 fT; Sg: By Lemma 3(i) we have {Sp j  {Tp j 8j 2 Np t

1 , in addition {
'
t is strictly
decreasing in t until t = p, and hence {'i > {
'
j 8i > j: Thus, 'p j = d 8j 2 Np t

1 , ' 2 fT; Sg:
Hence, 't = p 8' 2 fT; Sg: (II) Consider then the case n > p: Then, {Tp = 0, and hence Tp = v:
Since {'t is strictly decreasing in t until t = p and for all ' 2 fT; Sg; we have Tp j = d 8j 2 Np t

1 ;
which implies Tt = p. If then {Sp = 1; we know that maxnfnjUp (p) Up (p+ n) < 0g = 1: Hence,
it must be that maxnfnjUp 1 (p  1) Up 1 (p  1 + n)g  maxnfnjUp (p) Up (p+ n) < 0g+1 = 2
resulting in Sp 1 = d and 
S
p 2 fv; dg: Thus, St  p and St  n: Together (I) and (II) imply
that Tt  St :
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